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This FIW Special International Economics takes a long term perspective on international merchandise 
trade and tracks specialisation patterns of 19 world regions over the period 1980 to 2009. The data re-
veals that the path of trade specialisation is not predetermined: globalisation may intensify initial spe-
cialisations or may induce technological upgrading leading to new specialisation patterns. The emer-
gence of the highly successful East Asian electronics cluster is easily discernible from our analysis as is 
the catch-up process of Eastern Europe. The experience of these dynamic regions contrasts with that of 
the  African regions, West Asia and to some extent South America, whose primary role in the world 
economy is still that of oil and raw material suppliers. We also show that international trade in technol-
ogy intensive industries has broadened geographically. High income countries in Europe, Japan and 
the US which dominated trade in high tech manufactures until the 1980s have suffered a considerable 
loss of market shares to the benefit of emerging East Asian countries causing a lot of concern about the 
EU’s export performance in high technology industries among European policy makers. R&D policy has 
become a major component of Europe’s industrial policy which is intended to support the continuous 
process of technological upgrading high income countries need to remain competitive in world mar-
kets. European high income regions have been successful in this respect in the sense that their export 
structures continue to shift towards more technology intensive industries despite the losses of global 
market shares which must be seen as a consequence of a broader participation in world trade. We 
read the major shifts in global world trade over the past decades and in particular the ‘rise of Asia’ as 
evidence that active trade and industrial policies can ignite and support the industrialisation process 
and technological upgrading within the manufacturing sector. At the same time Eastern Europe showed 
that a technological catch-up process can also be achieved by relying on foreign direct investment 
and deep trade integration with more advanced trading partners in the region. In contrast, the policies 
pursued by South American countries after the debt-crisis of the 1980s did not seem to have fostered 
significant technological upgrading. Given the undetermacy of trade specialisation over time and the 
multiple paths to technological upgrading we believe  that international trade rules should ensure – 
more than they do now – that all countries have the required policy space to implement policies that 
foster structural changes in their economies.   
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Long Term Patterns of International Merchandise Trade 
1.  Introduction 
This FIW Special International Economics takes a long term perspective on trends and devel-
opments in international merchandise trade stretching from 1980 to 2009. The analysis is 
global in coverage and undertaken on the basis of 19 world regions, including five European 
regions1). The objective is to uncover long term trends in merchandise trade, including shifts in 
global market shares and paths of export specialisation. In some instances we try to relate the 
trade developments to the economic policies – mainly trade and industrial policies – pursued 
in respective regions. The export specialisation of countries or regions is investigated by look-
ing at their exports at the level of industries, whereby the industries are grouped together ac-
cording to their technology content  using  OECD’s technology classification  (see  Hat-
zichronoglou, 1997) 2
Splitting-up exports by technology content (of the exporting industries) allows tracking the 
patterns of specialisation and in particular the extent of industrialisation and/or technological 
upgrading that the regions have undertaken during the past 30 years. With the help of the 
trends unveiled by the data we derive answers to questions related to trade and globalisa-
tion.  In particular we are concerned with the questions, whether and to what extent the 
wave of globalisation that started around the mid-1980s has helped certain regions to move 
their production structures towards industrial goods and whether technological upgrading is 
a natural consequence of this globalisation process. Within Europe, we document the suc-
cess of the Eastern European
).  
3
A major concern for European policy makers is their countries’ export performance in high-
tech industries. Therefore we will also take a closer look at Central Europe’s global export 
market shares in high and medium-high tech industries and compare the developments with 
those of other advanced regions, in particular the US and Japan. 
) countries in shifting their export structures in the direction of 
more technology-intensive industries thereby converging to the export structure of Central 
Europe. Furthermore, the emergence of the South East and East Asian high tech cluster is dis-
cussed, including a comparison of the ASEAN countries’ experience with that of South Amer-
ica.  
The working hypothesis of this paper  is that the opportunities provided by globalisation in 
terms of structural change and growth could not be seized equally by all countries and re-
gions. This view is supported by Hausmann – Hwang – Rodrik’s (2007) who show that a coun-
try’s  level of export sophistication matters for economic growth. We apply Hausmann – 
Hwang – Rodrik (2007) framework to our dataset which serves as additional motivation for 
looking at global exports by technology content.  
                                                       
1) Austria will be included in the analysis as part of the Central Europe region (including also Belgium-Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ger-
many, France and the Netherlands). For a full list of regions and their members see Appendix 1.  
2) The analysis is based on data from UN Comtrade downloaded with the WITS application tool at the industry level (International 
Standard Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev.2.). Given our long time span we cannot use most recent industry and 
technology classifications as these do not exist for earlier periods.  
3) In this paper Eastern Europe includes the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and the Former 
Yugoslawian Countries.   
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Our analysis of the data presented in this FIW Special International Economics leads us to the 
conclusion that international trade and economic integration is, on average, beneficial for 
participating countries. At the same time trade openness and specialisation as such do not 
guarantee growth and development for all countries and regions involved. This is due to the 
fact that a series of regions are locked-in in unfavourable specialisations and their inability to 
move their production and export structure towards more technology intensive and higher 
value added industries. In other words, international trade provides great opportunities but 
gains from trade are neither automatic nor universal. This nuanced view of globalisation im-
plies that active trade and industrial  policies, if coupled with an outward-orientated and 
generally open trade regime, may be essential tools that enable countries to gain from inter-
national trade and specialisation.  
This FIW Special International Economics proceeds as follows: section 2 provides an overview 
of positions and global shifts in export market shares. Section 3 starts out with some evidence 
on the positive relationship between export sophistication and growth and then proceeds 
with the major results on the global developments of export structures by technology content 
and technological upgrading. Section 4 concludes by discussing the implications for trade 
and industrial policies. 
2.  Positions and shifts in global export market  
This section recapitules some major trends in global trade since the 1980s including the emer-
gence of new trading powers which is reflected in their increased export market shares. It 
also serves the purpose of introducing the 19 world regions to the reader. The export market 
shares of all regions in the period 2005-2009, along with changes of their market shares since 
the mid-1980s are shown in Figure 1. 
A first observation is that exports are rather concentrated within the four major trading re-
gions4) – Central Europe (EUC), the United States (US), Japan (JA) and China (CN). Together 
they accounted for more than 45% of global exports in the period 2004-20095
The slight decrease in export concentration is the result of a broader participation of different 
regions in international trade, in particular since the beginning of the 1990s. The loss of shares 
in global exports experienced by the ‘traditional’ major trading powers
). In previous 
years, global exports were similarly or even more concentrated with the four major trading 
regions accounting for half of global exports in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  
6
                                                       
4) The major trading regions have or had an export market share of 10% or more in at least one of the six 5-year periods under consid-
eration.  
), i.e. Central Europe, 
the US and Japan, is to a large degree the consequence of the emergence of China and 
other emerging regions as more active players in global trade. China’s trade performance 
over the last three decades is indeed outstanding: between 1980-1984 and 2005-2009 China 
managed to increase its share in global exports by 9 percentage points to reach 10.3% in the 
5) Note that these regions do not correspond to free trade areas such as the EU27 or NAFTA. If one included, for example, the remain-
ing EU-countries into the calculation, the market share of the major trading regions would increase by another 14-15 percentage 
points to roughly 70%. Likewise including the US’ NAFTA-partners, Canada and Mexico, would further increase this export market 
share. 
6) The same is true for the other developed regions Northern Europe (EUN), Western Europe – which is the UK - (EUW) and Other Devel-
oped Countries (OD) which also experienced losses in market shares.    
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period 2005-2009. This remarkable gain in market share is visualised in Figure 1 where China is 
positioned at the very top of the diagramme. 
 
Figure 1: Shares in global export markets and changes in market shares by region 
Export market shares in 2005-2009 (horizontal axis) in percent, changes in export markets shares from 1980-1984 to 
2005-2009 (vertical axis) in percentage points   
 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations. Calculations of export market shares include intra-regional trade. Regions 
are colour coded: Red = major trading regions; blue = emerging regions; green = small or marginalised trading regions; black = other. 
JA=Japan, CN=China, EAH=East Asia High Income, EAO= Other East Asia; EUC=Central Europe, EUE=East Europe, EUN=Northern 
Europe, EUS=Southern Europe, EUW=Western Europe (UK); US=USA, ACX= Central America and Mexico, AM=South America, 
OD=Other Developed; AFN=North Africa, AFS=Other Africa, WA=West Asia, CI=Commomwealth of Independentr States, IN=India, 
ASO=Other South Asia. 
Using the gains in market shares since the early 1980s as indicator we can identify High In-
come East Asia (EAH), Other East Asia (EAO), India (IN), the former Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CI) and Eastern Europe (EUE) as emerging regions - next to China which we 
qualify as a ‘major trading region’. In Figure 1 these emerging regions are found on the upper 
left hand side (shown in blue). Note that some of these emerging regions still have rather low 
export market shares and their gains since the early 1980s appear to be relatively modest. In 
the case of India for example, the gain in market share amounted to 0.8 percentage points. 
Expressed in terms of its 1980-1984 market share, however, this constitutes a 167% percent in-
crease! High Income East Asia which started much earlier to integrate into the world econ-
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in the period 2005-2009, making it the fourth ‘largest’ trading region after Central Europe, 
China and the US (overtaking Japan).  
In contrast to the obvious successes of these emerging regions there is also a number of re-
gions whose export market share show no clear upward trend or even a declining trend as in 
the case of North Africa (AFN) or Other Africa (AFS). Similarly, Other South Asia (ASO) remains 
marginalised in world trade with a stagnant export market share of 0.3%. Even South Amer-
ica (AM) basically stagnated in terms of global export market shares over the last three dec-
ades. The different trends that distinguish ‘emerging trading regions’ from what we may call 
‘small trading and marginalised regions’ are better seen when looking at the development 
over time. Figure 2 highlights the marked differences between the two groups showing the 
clear upward trend in market shares discernible in emerging markets – a feature that is ab-
sent in the small and marginalised regions. Figure 2 also shows that in some of the emerging 
regions, notably in the South East Asian regions, the growth of global market shares has al-
ready flattened out after the very rapid increase during the 1990s.  
 
Figure 2: Global export market shares of emerging versus small and marginalised regions, 1980-2009 
 Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations. EUE=East Europe, EAH=East Asia High Income, EAO= 
Other East Asia; ACX= Central America and Mexico, AM=South America, AFN=North Africa, AFS=Other Africa, 
CI=Commomwealth of Independentr States, IN=India, ASO=Other South Asia. 
 
It is also interesting to compare the trade performance of individual regions which were ini-
tially in similar positions. For example, Other South East Asia (EAO), which comprises mainly the 
ASEAN countries except Singapore, and South America both started out with a global export 
market share of approximately 3% in the early 1980s. Obviously, the development paths of 
these two regions in terms of exports shares were very different during the 1990s and until 
2005. Other South East Asia was able to increase its share in global exports to over 5% in 2005-
2009 while South America’s share basically stagnated.  
The marked differences in the development of global market shares across regions is a first 
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ronment, particularly since the 1990s7
3.  Export Structures, Technological Upgrading and Growth 
), have been distributed very unequally across world re-
gions.  
This section deals with changes in the world regions’ export structures. To this end we will 
mainly track the development of exports by technology content, employing OECD’s tech-
nology classification which distinguishes between low-tech, medium-low, medium-high and 
high tech industries as well as an unclassified category which contains non-manufacturing 
goods such as unrefined oil.  
Before doing so, however, we use Hausmann – Rodrik – Hwang’s (2007) empirically derived 
measure of export sophistication to demonstrate that a country’s export structure seems to 
be systematically related to a country’s subsequent growth experience.  
3.1  Export sophistication and economic growth 
To calculate a country’s level of export sophistication (or productivity level of exports) a pro-
ductivity level is assigned to each product which depends on the weighted income of the 
countries exporting this product. A country’s level of export sophistication is then obtained by 
summing up over all assigned productivity levels weighting with the share of the respective 
product in the countries’ export basket. In essence, this means that a countries’ level of ex-
port sophistication is the higher, the more it exports products predominantly exported by high-
income countries8
Given the construction of the productivity level of exports, it is clear that this measure is highly 
correlated with GDP per capita. This is shown in Figure 3 for the year 1995 – the middle of our 
period of investigation. Countries below the line have a comparatively low level of export so-
phistication given their income level while the opposite is true for countries above the line. In 
Figure 3 the countries are colour-coded with the colours indicating the ‘wider regions’ which 
are South East and East Asia, Europe, Americas, Africa and West Asia and a region termed 






                                                       
7) A major step was the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO in 1995. In parallel to progress in multilateral 
trade negotiations regional integration also deepened, above all in Europe, South East Asia and North America (e.g. creation of 
NAFTA in 1994). 
8) For details see Hausmann – Rodrik – Hwang (2007). 
9) The wider regions are defined as follows: South East and East Asia (SEEA) includes Japan, China, East Asia High Income, Other East 
Asia. Europe includes Central Europe, East Europe, North Europe, South Europe,  West Europe. Americas and European Offsprings 
(Americas) include USA, Central America and Mexico, South America, Other Developed. Africa and West Asia (Africa+) includes 
North Africa, Other Africa, West Asia. Other includes India, Other South Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States.   
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Figure 3: Relationship between GDP per capita and the productivity level of exports, 2005 
   
Source: World Development Indicators, UN Comtrade, wiiw-calculations. Colours indicate the ‘wider region’ a country belongs to: 
Orange = South East and East Asia (SEEA) including Japan, China, East Asia High Income, Other East Asia. Blue = Europe including 
Central Europe, East Europe, North Europe, South Europe, West Europe. Red = Americas and European Offsprings (Americas) including 
USA, Central America and Mexico, South America, Other Developed. Green = Africa and West Asia (Africa+) including North Africa, 
Other Africa, West Asia. Grey = Other including India, Other South Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Note that most of the South East and East Asian countries (orange coloured) and in particular 
the emerging countries in the region are above the regression line, indicating their export 
basket is ‘more sophisticated’ than their current income level would suggest. For example, in 
2005 the Philippines (PH) had a PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of about 3,000 US-Dollars but its 
productivity level of exports (approximately 17,500) was close to that of Poland (PL) which 
had a GDP per capita of 13,800 US-Dollars. Likewise, the GDP per capita level of Canada 
(CA) was about three times that of Malaysia (MY) but the productivity levels of exports of 
both countries were very similar. Moreover, China figures among the countries whose produc-
tivity level of exports exceeds by far its level of GDP per capita.  
The income level that is associated with a country’s export basket is an interesting measure as 
such but it is primarily interesting because it is found to be associated to a country’s future 
growth rate. Following Hausmann – Rodrik – Hwang (2007) we regress GDP growth from 1995-
2005 on initial GDP per capita in 1995 and the initial level of export sophistication. The result 
suggests that there is a statistically highly significant relationship between the level of export 
sophistication and economic growth: a 10% increase in the level of export sophistication in-
creases subsequent growth by 0.16 percentage points. The positive (partial) relationship be-
tween GDP per capita growth in the period 1995-2005 and the level of productivity level of 
exports in 1995 is visualised in Figure 4.  
The level of export sophistication is a rather crude measure but it is sufficient to show that in 
addition to possible efficiency gains from specialisation, international trade most likely also 
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port sophistication and growth is in line with the view that the main effect from trade and 
specialisation are not gains from increased allocative efficiency which are unambiguously 
positive. Rather, for most countries the major effect from international trade will be a growth 
effect which may be positive or negative, depending on the path of export specialisation a 
country embarks on. In some instances this may imply that countries which specialise accord-
ing to current comparative advantages may forego higher growth rates that would have 
been possible if the country had endeavoured to move its production and exports to more 
‘sophisticated’ industries which may at that stage be not totally in line with its endowment 
structure and technology.  
 
Figure 4: Partial Relationship between growth of GDP per capita and initial productivity level of exports, 
1995-2005 
   
Source: World Development Indicators, UN Comtrade, wiiw-calculations. Colours indicate the ‘wider region’ a country belongs to: 
Orange = South East and East Asia (SEEA) including Japan, China, East Asia High Income, Other East Asia. Blue = Europe including 
Central Europe, East Europe, North Europe, South Europe, West Europe. Red = Americas and European Offsprings (Americas) including 
USA, Central America and Mexico, South America, Other Developed. Green = Africa and West Asia (Africa+) including North Africa, 
Other Africa, West Asia. Grey = Other including India, Other South Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
Since high income countries tend to export products with higher technology content there is 
a link between exporting products from high tech industries and a high level of export sophis-
tication.  
3.2  Export structures by technology content 
The fact that a country’s export structure matters for its growth performance is an additional 
motivation for investigating the structural development of exports over time. As already men-
tioned we do this by disaggregating merchandise exports into exports of low, medium-low, 
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Figure 5: The ‘Fruits’ of Globalisation: Specialisation - South Asia vs. China, 1980-2009 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations.ASO=Other South Asia, CN=China (including Macao). 
 
A first observation is that both Other South  Asia and China moved away from exporting 
commodities – which in both regions accounted for approximately 35% of exports in 1980-
1984 – to exporting manufactures. But this is as far as commonalities go. Other South Asia 
which already started with a very high share of low tech manufactures in 1980-1984 (approx. 
50%) further specialised in low tech exports which increased to more than two thirds in the pe-
riod 2000-2004. This reflects the increasing share of garments and other textiles in the export 
basket of countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. In contrast, little dynamism is found in high, 
medium-high and even medium-low tech products. In other words, in South Asia globalisation 
has intensified an existing comparative advantage in low technology industries, implying little 
technological upgrading.  
The development in the Other South Asian region, which excludes India, contrasts with the 
experience of China. Over the 1980s and 1990s, China managed to continuously reduce the 
share of exports produced by low tech industries which had been the dominant industries un-
til the mid-1990s and to expand the exports of high tech and medium-high tech industries. In 
2005-2009, the share of high tech products stood at 30%, among the highest in the world.  
This favourable shift in the export structure reflects China’s integration in the Asian production 
networks, particularly the creation of the Asian electronics cluster (see for example Gaulier – 
Lemoine – Ünal-Kesenci, 2007). In this integration process China benefited greatly from Ja-
pan’s leadership in high tech industries such as electronics and its industry structure gradually 
approached that of Japan.   
China’s technological upgrading was also supported by the inflow of foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI). Motivated by low costs of labour in China foreign multinationals started to shift 
labour-intensive stages of production (often assembling) to China, particularly from the mid-
1990s onwards. The exports of these multinationals, including US, Japanese but also European 
firms, of course also shape the structure of China’s trade. All these factors helped China to di-
versify its economy and to shift its export structure away from commodities and into manufac-
turing.  
Trade openness and selective openness for FDI were cornerstones in China’s highly successful 
export-led growth strategy. But China’s catch-up process was not simply the result of an in-
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countries before, made extensive use of active industrial policy targeting selected industries 
(e.g. optical and consumer electronics), providing support support for both state-companies 
and start-up firms. Other features of Chinese industrial policy were arrangement with foreign 
firms to transfer their technologies in exchange for privileged market access and the setting 
of technology standards to the advantage of domestic firms in order to reduce technologi-
cal dependence on foreign firms (Linden, 2004)11
In the above comparison, Other South Asia served as an example of a region that is locked-in 
with a rather unfavourable export structure producing low tech manufactures (which is pre-
sumably in line with its current comparative advantages).  
).   
Figure 6 shows the export structures of three more regions which over the last three decades 
found it impossible to diversify away from their initial specialisation. These are the resource-rich 
regions North Africa (AFN) and West Asia (WA), which are both heavily engaged in exporting 
oil, and Other Africa (AFS) which is exporting various commodities and also oil. The high de-
pendence of these regions on commodity exports is in line with McMillan and Rodrik (2011) 
who also argue that comparative advantages in primary products reduce the scope for pro-
ductivity improving structural change.  
While it is true that these three regions reduced the share of commodities in their export bas-
ket between 1980 and 1999, this trend has been reversed in the new millennium12
 
). As a con-
sequence the share of commodities was still around 70% in North Africa and West Asia and 
well over 60% in Other Africa in the period 2005-2009. 
Figure 6: North Africa, Other Africa and West Asia: Locked in resource-based export specialisation:   
 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations.  
 
                                                       
11) We mention here China’s industrial policies as one of the elements that contributed to China’s successful development, particu-
larly since the 1990s. Other authors stress the important role of China’s favourably low real exchange rate in China’s export-led growth 
model.  
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The increase in the share of low and medium-low tech exports in the three regions signals to a 
large degree the build-up of refining capacity within the regions13). With the build-up of refin-
ing capacity being at the core of the (slight) technological upgrading14
Hence, as of 2009 all three regions are locked-in in their resource-based comparative advan-
tages. North Africa and West Asia still serve as global oil suppliers with little integration in the 
world trade network outside this area. Specialisation in oil and raw materials means that there 
are fewer opportunities for vertical specialisation and production sharing typically found 
within manufacturing industries that produce more complex products.  
) until the end of the 
1990s, this does not necessarily constitute a strong diversification as it is still closely linked to 
their natural resource endowments.  
Another rather resource-rich region is South America (AM). In comparison to the African re-
gions and West Asia, South America has a much stronger industrial base. In Figure 7 this can 
be seen from the fact that already back in the 1980s South American manufacturing exports 
accounted for roughly 60% of total exports and exports of commodities for about 40%. Fig-
ure 7 compares the evolution of the South American region’s export structure with that of the 
Other East Asian region (EAO) which comprises mainly the ASEAN countries except Singa-
pore. As mentioned earlier both regions started with a share in global exports of about 3% in 
the early 1980s. The initial conditions back in the 1980s in terms of export structures were rather 
unfavourable  in the Other East Asian region compared to South America because  it  ex-
ported predominantly commodities.  
 
Figure 7: Industrialisation and structural upgrading in Other East Asia and South America 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations.  
 
                                                       
13) If countries invest in petroleum refineries (ISCI 3530) and export refined oil, this is recorded as an export of a medium-low tech indus-
try. A specialisation of this kind with high exports of commodities and a high share of medium-low technologies is for example observ-
able for the Former Soviet Union.  
14) In West Asia and in Other Africa there may also be a higher degree of non-oil related manufacturing exports because the former 
include Turkey which has a completely different export structure from the oil-exporting countries in the region and the latter includes 
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Like the High Income Asian region (EAH) which coincides with the Newly Industrialised Coun-
tries in Asia (NIC 4 including Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) the industrialisa-
tion process in Other East Asian countries was strongly supported by government interven-
tions. Malaysia and Thailand were among the first countries in the region to follow the exam-
ple of Japan and the NICs and moved to trade liberalisation and export promotion policies in 
the early 1980s (Weiss, 2005).  
The pattern of industrialisation in South East Asia is very well summarised by Akamatsu’s ‘Flying 
Geese Paradigm’. According to this paradigm, Japan as the leading technological power in 
the region served as the ‘lead-goose’, followed by the other countries of the region in the 
‘wild-geese-flying-pattern‘. In this pattern, the follower countries  are aligned according to 
their stage of development. In the Asian case, Japan was followed in the first row by the NICs 
and in the second row by countries like Malaysia, Thailand, the Phillipines and Indonesia.   
The central feature in the flying geese paradigm is that as countries in the front of the forma-
tion grow richer (or industries mature) some of their industries move to countries further back 
because of cost advantages. By this process, countries ‘in the back rows’ inherit to a great 
extent the industrial structure of more advanced countries in the region. For example, as the 
NICs further upgraded their production structures and wages rose, comparative advantages 
in low-tech industries (e.g. textiles, toys, food processing) were lost and production moved to 
the countries like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines fostering industrialisation there.  
From the 1980s onwards the industrialisation process in major ASEAN countries was supported 
by foreign direct investment (FDI), mainly from Japan and the NICs. At that time Malaysia and 
Thailand were among the developing countries with the most open and liberal FDI regimes, 
though important restrictions were still in place, e.g. with respect to ownership limits (Thomsen 
1999). The presence of FDI also explains why, apart from low-tech industries, also high-tech 
industries show a strong upward tendency in the Other East Asian export baskets already in 
the early phase of industrialisation. We will return to the role of regional trade in Asia further 
below in the context of the South East Asian technology cluster.  
In contrast to the experience in East Asia, technological upgrading in South America was very 
modest. There is a slight increase in the relative importance of medium-high tech industries 
but high tech exports account for a very low share of South American exports (presumably 
mainly Brazilian exports of aeroplanes) and the region also remains strongly dependent on 
the export of commodities which account for more than 40% of total export as had been the 
case in the 1980s. It is therefore fair to say that the liberal economic policies that most coun-
tries in South America implemented after the debts-crisis of the 1980s - following the prescrip-
tions of the Washington Consensus – did not help much to improve the export structures of 
the countries in the region. These policies included, next to far-reaching tariff reductions also 
the liberalisation of the capital account and an absence of active industrial policies.   
While Figure 7 suggests little change in the technology content of South American exports, re-
search by Pages (2010) and McMillan and Rodrik (2011) suggest that Latin American (and 
also African) developing countries have experienced ‘negative’ structural change in their 
economies from 1990 to 2005, a period in which all developing countries in their sample be-
came more globalised. ‘Negative’ structural change in this context means that changes in 
the production structure had a negative impact on the economy wide productivity. Nega-
tive structural change occurs if industries contract, for example due to import competition,  
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and the labour released from these industries only finds occupations in activities with lower 
productivity (e.g. informal sector). The opposite is true for South East Asian countries which 
registered significant positive structural change leading also to the technological upgrading 
in their export structure as shown in Figure 7. 
Admittedly, the absence of changes in the export composition does not rule out dynamic 
export growth. However, the comparison of export growth in South America and Other East 
Asia between 1980 and 2009 shows that the share in global exports rose by only 2% in South 
America  while  Other East Asia’s share increased by 55%. Therefore the South America – 
ASEAN comparison clearly supports the idea that technological upgrading is a key element 
for long term export success.  
We now turn to an example of very important changes in the export structure in Europe, fol-
lowing a historical political change. After the collapse of the Former Soviet Union and the dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact  and COMECON East Europe turned towards Central Europe, 
both politically and economically, a process which finally led to the accession of ten Eastern 
European countries to the EU in 2004 and 2007. The fundamental shifts in production and ex-
port structures, however, started much earlier as shown in Figure 8.  
From the 1990s onwards, East Europe strongly increased its share of medium-high and high 
tech exports, from 20% and 1.4% in the period 1980-1984 to 41% and 13.7% respectively in 
2004-2009. This means that East Europe’s export structure converged to those of Central 
Europe. The gap in the share of high tech exports between Eastern and Central Europe could 
be closed and in the case of medium-high tech exports was reduced to 5.7 percentage 
points. A similar convergence of export structures is observable for low and medium-low tech 
products. In both Central Europe and East Europe the relative share of these exports declined 
in relative terms but much more so in East Europe leading to a closing of the gap in the impor-
tance of low and medium-low technology exports. This convergence of export structures is in 
line with the findings in Francois – Wörz (2011) who report that the New EU-Member states 
(NMS-10) were those with the greatest structural change during the period 1995-2007 despite 
a very unfavourable initial export structure15
 
).   
   
                                                       
15) Unfavourable initial condition in the context of the decomposition analysis undertaken by Francois – Wörz (2011) means that the 
NMS-10 were mainly specialised in products which experienced rather low rates of global export growth between 1995 and 2007.    
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Figure 8: Convergence of export structures within Europe 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations.EUC=Central Europe, EUE=East Europe. 
 
A series of factors contributed to this rapid catch-up process of East Europe, including among 
others, a high level of education, geographic proximity to Central Europe and strong histori-
cal ties and in several countries a long-standing industrial tradition dating back to the pre-
Communist era. All these factors eased the emergence of regional production sharing be-
tween Central Europe and East Europe which is one of the main explanatory factors why the 
export structures of Eastern and Western Europe became very similar rather quickly. Hence, 
as opposed to the situation of global oil suppliers, here there were positive feed backs be-
tween upgrading of export structures and reinforcement of regional trade16
There are parallels in the process of technological upgrading between Eastern Europe and 
East Asian countries inasfar as both benefited strongly from regional trade and foreign direct 
investment by more advanced partners within the region and both followed an outward-
looking,  export-led growth strategy. At the same time, the two regions also embarked on 
very distinct development paths because government support and industrial policy played a 
much smaller role in East Europe than in South East Asia. Moreover East Europe had a much 
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Box 1: Focus Austria - Export Specialisation in medium-high tech industries intensified 
Austria’s export structure is similar to that of the other Central European countries (Ger-
many, France, Switzerland, Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Figure B.1. shows 
the relative importance of exports of low, medium-low, medium-high and high tech indus-
tries in Austria from 1980-1984 to 2005-2009.  
 
Figure B.1 Austria’s export structure by technology content 
 
  Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations. 
 
At the core of Austria’s industrial export base are medium-high tech industries which in-
clude Austria’s three leading export industries: the machinery and equipment industry, the 
automotive industry and chemicals (except for the pharmaceuticals industry which is clas-
sified as a high tech industry). The share of medium-high tech exports increased from 33% 
in 1980-1984 to 45% in 2005-2009. The share of high tech products also increased by 5.8 
percentage points but with a share of 10.4% in 2005-2009 it was still considerably lower 
than in Central Europe as a whole (where it stood at 14.6%). In contrast, the relative impor-
tance of low and medium-low tech industries declined. Hence, over the past 30 years Aus-
tria registered a structural upgrading from low and medium-low tech industries to high and 
medium-high tech industries and its specialisation in medium-high tech exports intensified. 
 
We now shortly return to the developments in South East Asia and China, the most dynamic 
regions of the past two decades. The countries of the East Asian High Income region (EAH), i.e 
the Asian NICs, started to move into manufacturing already in the 1960s strongly supported 
by national industrial policies17
                                                       
17) The positive contribution of the activtist industrial policies in the NICs and later in ASEAN countries and China is hardly disputed 
anymore and has even been recognised by the World Bank (1993). 
) and a favourable real exchange rate. These industrial policies 
varied considerably across countries and included a wide array of measures such as tariff 
free imports of raw materials and other inputs for targeted industries, infant industry tariffs, ex-
port subsidies, cheap trade finance, selectively open FDI regimes designed to attract inward 
FDI in targeted industries but coupled with ownership restrictions in firms and for land pur-
chases. The ASEAN countries (Other South East Asia) turned to outward-orientated trade poli-
cies in the 1980s, flanked by a similar mix of industrial policies implemented in the NICs. As was 
shown, initially these policies led to an increase in the share of low tech industries, a trend that 
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the share of high tech exports also increased already in the 1980s18
 
). Figure 9 highlights the 
rapid increase in high tech exports for China, the South East Asia High Income region, Other 
South East Asia and Japan from 1980 to 2009.  
Figure 9: South-East and East Asian Electronics Cluster: Share of high tech industry exports in total exports 
& the wider regions global market share 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations. 
 
China, which was clearly a laterunner in the region, also experienced a remarkable structural 
change, boosting its relative share of high tech exports from almost nil at the beginning of the 
1980s to about 30% in the period 2005-2009. Note, however, that this 30% share is overstated 
by the fact that trade – and particularly intra-regional trade - in high-tech industries involves a 
lot of trade in intermediates goods so that goods (or parts thereof) cross borders several times 
before a final product is exported. The actual value added created at each stage can be 
rather small. For China, the share of high tech industries in total manufacturing value added is 
estimated to be around 13% (Chandrasekhar – Ghosh, 2011). This is obviously much lower 
than the 30% share we find in the (gross) export structure. Nevertheless the trend over time is 
very similar when looking at value added data which confirms the structural upgrading.     
As pointed out above, the importance of high tech exports in South East and East Asia is 
mainly due to the region’s specialisation in the electronic industry, a development that was 
initiated by Japan’s export structure which in the 1980s had been already highly geared to-
wards high tech and medium-high tech products. Note also that the share of high tech ex-
ports in Japan’s exports has decreased by about 8 percentage points between 1995-1999 
and 2004-2009 and was flat before. This development reflects the fact that Japanese com-
panies made (and still make) use of low-cost destinations in Asia to perform labour-intensive 
tasks in the production of electronics. This vertical specialisation, i.e. specialisation in particular 
steps in the production process within an industry also explains the rather quick increase in 
high tech exports in China and Other East Asia in their early phase of industrialisation.  
                                                       
18) Other South East Asia non-manufacturing exports still accounted for 20% of the total which is to a large degree due to Indonesia’ 
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The success of the South East and East Asian electronics cluster is reflected by the fact that 
the share of global high tech exports of the wider South East and East Asian region increased 
substantially over the last three decades – from about 30% in the period 1980-1984 to 50% in 
the period 2005-2009. In the case of South East and East Asia it is particularly obvious that the 
specialisation in complex high tech manufacturing industries is closely linked to vertical spe-
cialisation which is predominantly regional in scope. The intensive trade in intermediates re-
sulting from the regional production sharing leads to very high market shares in high tech in-
dustries for South East and East Asia. The fact that products are re-exported several times and 
at each production stage (which may be labour-intensive though performed in high-tech in-
dustries) only little value added is created, have to be taken into account when relating mar-
ket shares in high tech exports to the technological capacity.  
The importance of vertical specialisation in high tech manufacturing within the region is con-
firmed by data on trade in parts and components – a common proxy for the degree of verti-
cal specialisation. South East and East Asian regions have comparatively high shares of parts 
and components in both their imports and exports. Moreover, the share of parts and compo-
nents trade is highest in intra-regional trade of the wider South East and East Asian region19
Figure 10 illustrates that on average the share of technology driven exports reflects very well a 
country’s  R&D capacity as proxied by gross expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) in percent of GDP
).  
20
This positive relationship is not surprising and it shows that for most countries a change of the 
export structure towards technology intensive exports generally reflects higher R&D intensity 
(higher R&D-GDP ratios). But figure 10 also shows that there are some outliers. For example, 
Israel has relatively little high tech exports given its very high R&D-GDP ratio of over 4%, which 
is partly due to Israel’s strong agro-industrial R&D focus. On the other hand, the vertical spe-
cialisation within the Asian electronics cluster implies that for some South East Asian countries 
– such as the Phillipines and Malaysia but also Singapore – the (very high shares of) technol-
ogy-driven exports overstate the countries’ R&D capacities because they perform a lot of la-
bour-intensive taks within the production process of high tech goods. With an average R&D-
GDP ratio of 2% and a share of approximately 26% of technology driven exports, Austria’s ex-
ports reflect rather well its R&D efforts.  
). In other words, the relative importance of technology-driven 
exports increases with the R&D-GDP ratio. 
 
 
                                                       
19) The analysis of parts and components trade reveals some information on the position of the regions within the regional production 
network. For example, 32% of Japan’s total exports represent parts and components – a much higher relative share compared to its 
imports (parts and components trade: 19.8%). This signals that Japan is still the major provider of technology in the South East and East 
Asian production networks because in many cases the production of specialised inputs requires more skills and is technologically 
more demanding than the final assembling of these inputs to a final product. This supports the claim made above that Japan’s initial 
specialisation was key for the creation of the Asian production networks (Flying-Geese-Paradigm’). China is situated in the opposite 
position within the production network, with parts and components accounting for 30.6% of its imports, compared to 23% on the ex-
port side. This is complemented by a high share of consumption goods (i.e. final goods) in its exports.  
20) In order to avoid too great reliance on OECD’s technology classification we use here another classification developed by Peneder 
(2003). This classification distinguishes between mainstream, labour intensive, capital intensive, marketing driven, technology driven 
manufacturing industries.  
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Figure 10: Relationship between R&D expenditures and Technology Driven Exports 
Average 1996-2007 
 
Source:  UNIDO,  UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations.  Technology-driven exports according to the classification of 
Peneder (2003). 
As was shown above, the integration of more regions between 1980 and 2009 into the world 
trading system led to losses in the global market shares of the traditional trading powers (Cen-
tral Europe, US, Japan). For European policy makers, Europe’s rather low share of high tech 
exports in its total exports and consequently a relatively low global export market share in 
high technology exports is reason for constant concern. The European Commission, for ex-
ample, laments that in Europe innovative small and medium size firms do not grow sufficiently 
in order to become large R&D investing companies (European Commisison, 2011). As a con-
sequence, the EU’s industrial structure may not be sufficiently geared towards leading-edge, 
fast growing industries. In contrast to other high-income regions, the global market shares in 
high tech exports of Central Europe and North Europe are lower than their global market 
shares in total exports. Central Europe’s global market share was 20.8% in the period 2005-
2009 while its export market share in high tech industries stood at 17.6%21
At this tage it should should be noted that from a European perspective, the decline in the 
market share of products exported by medium-high tech industries (-8.7 percentage points 
between 1980-1984 and 2005-2009) is more relevant for competitiveness and employment 
than the 5.2 percentage point loss in the high tech segment, as it concerns the majority of 
European main export industries. Moreover, according to the Innovation Union Competitive-
ness Report 2011 (European Commission, 2011) medium-high tech industries account for al-
). However, Central 
Europe’s export market share in high tech industries declined only slightly between the 1980s 
and the period 2005-2009. The loss of market shares was much larger for the US and Japan. 
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most half (48%) of European R&D businesses expenditures. This may indicate that medium-
high tech industries offer sufficient opportunities for European companies to remain competi-
tive (despite high wage costs) by differentiating and upgrading their products.   
Given the distorting effects of vertical integration on the relative positions in high technology 
trade, it is useful to take a look at value added data in global manufacturing. Figure 11 shows 
the shares in world industrial value added which we took from Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 
(2011). The value added consideration may gives a clearer picture of where global manufac-
turing in actually taking place. Obviously, these figures include value added created by for-
eign subsidiaries firms that create value added in their respective host economy. The draw-
back of this approach is that we do not have this kind of data readily available for all regions. 
Figure 11 indicates that, in value added terms, the United States are still dominhigh tech in-
dustries with a value added share of more than 30%.  
 
Figure 11: Global market shares of manufacturing value added, selected regions 
 
Source: Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2011). 
 
In line with what we observe in the export data, the share of the EU in global high tech ex-
ports remained rather constant at about 25% from 1985-2007. In contrast, the market shares of 
the USA and of Japan declined rather strongly over the past 20 years, also in value added 
terms. From Figure 11 it is also obvious that the structural upgrading in South East and East Asia 
and particularly in China is not entirely driven by double-counting of trade flows due to trade 
in intermediates. China managed to increase its value added  share in global high tech 
manufactures from a mere 3.1% in 1985 to 13.7% in 2007. Taking the wider South East Asian 
region together, the combined value added share in high tech manufacturing was about 
35% in 2007. 
Finally, the assertion that the EU is not primarily specialised in high tech manufacturing (but 



























































United States EU Japan China and Hong Kong Asia-9 India 
 
     
20    FIW Special 
     
 
counts for 28.8% of global manufacturing value added, less than the respective share for high 
tech industries.   
Finally, it should be noted that despite the broader participation of regions in global trade of 
technologically advanced manufactures, some low and middle income regions, including 
the whole of Africa, West Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Other South Asia 
and also India, remain technologically marginalised with market shares close to zero in high 
tech exports and very low export market shares in medium-high tech industries22
 
).  
Box 2: Focus Austria - R&D expenditures in an international comparison  
 
Austria has increased its R&D expenditures markedly since the 1990s reflecting its successful  
‘catching-up’ process in this domaine (Schibany and Jörg, 2005). While Austrian gross ex-
penditure on R&D (GERD) in percent of GDP is still far below that of European benchmark 
countries such as Finland it is more or less at par with that of Germany (Figure B.2).  
 
Figure B.2 R&D expenditures (in % of GDP) in Austria and selected countries 
 
  Source: UN Comtrade (WITS download), wiiw-calculations. 
 
Typically a country’s R&D-GDP-ratio is rather persistent, changing only slowly over time. This 
is particularly true for mature industrialised countries as can be seen in the United States, 
the United Kingdom or France. This makes the growth of the R&D expenditures (as a per-
centage of GDP) in Austria from 1.7% in 1996-1999 to 2.4% in 2004-2007 all the more re-
markable. Up to 2005 the increase in R&D expenditures was mainly due to higher invest-
ment in R&D by the business sector, to a large extent financed by company cash flows 
(Schibany and Jörg, 2005). In more recent years, however, the relative share of public R&D 
expenditure rose and during the crisis public R&D expenditure increased anticyclically, 
compensating for reduced R&D investment in the private sector (European Commission, 
2011).  
                                                       
22) Russia and South Africa do have some R&D capacities as reflected in R&D-GDP ratios of 1% or more. However, they seem unable 
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The substantial increases in R&D expenditures (which were far above the European aver-
age over the last decade) pushed Austria closer to its 3% target rate which – based on the 
current annual trend – will be reached by 2012. By 2020 Austria could be at the world fore-
front with a value similar to that of Finland, Japan or South Korea according to recent pro-
jections  (European Commission, 2011).  Despite these very positive developments in the 
Austrian innovation system, some shortcomings still prevail such as the large concentration 
of business R&D expenditures in a few large corporations (Schibany and Jörg, 2005).  
In a broader international comparison the R&D intensity of EU-countries (with the important 
exeption of Northern Europe) is still below that of the US, Japan and South Korea. R&D in-
tensities are also on the rise in emerging markets, most notably in China which doubled its 
R&D expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) since the mid-1990s to 1.4% in the period 
2004-2007. The European Commission also noted that in terms of R&D personnel China has 
taken the world lead in 2008 with 1.6 million researchers, followed by the EU (1.5 million) 
and the United States (1.4 million)(European Commission, 2011).  
 
4.  Policy Implications and Conclusions 
One of the main results that emerged from looking at the trends in international trade over 
the past thirty years is that globalisation has obviously led to a much broader participation in 
international trade. These geographically more inclusive trade links include deeper forms of 
economic integration such as international production sharing. The developments went hand 
in hand with a marked technological upgrading in the production and export structures of 
regions in South East and East Asia and in Eastern Europe. To some extent the technological 
upgrading in South East and East Asia shown is this paper may be overstated because of ver-
tical integration  process in which China and some ASEAN countries specialise in labour-
intentive parts of the production process of high technology goods. Nevertheless, the fact 
that these countries are integrated in international production networks testifies  a certain 
level of managerial and technological capacities which are needed to participate in such 
networks. Moreover, the development of R&D capacities, particularly in China, is an indica-
tion that technological upgrading has been taken place, even though not to the extent as 
suggested by export data.   
Structural upgrading seems to be linked to gains in global export market shares. Therefore 
China and the emerging regions that we identified in this paper can be considered as the 
main beneficiaries from the latest wave of globalisation that had started around the mid-
1980s and intensified strongly during the 1990ies. In contrast to technologically marginalised 
regions, the integration of these new players, i.e. China and the emerging regions, into global 
and regional trade networks was not limited to labour intensive, low tech industries and 
commodities but also translated into gains in export market shares in high tech and medium-
high tech industries.  
Despite the new competition from emerging regions high income regions, including Central 
Europe, Northern Europe and the UK, also gained from globalisation due to the opening of 
new markets and in recent years growing demand from emerging markets has become a 
major pillar for export growth. Moreover, the export structure of European high income re-
gions also moved towards more technology intensive industries where opportunities to remain 
competitive through innovation and product differentiation are higher. Moreover, in many  
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regions of the world, including Eastern Europe and China, multinational firms from the ‘tradi-
tional’ industrialised regions contribute strongly to the export success of the emerging regions 
by setting up foreign subsidiaries in these markets.  Therefore the majority of world regions 
have clearly benefited from a more open trade and investment environment.   
It must be stressed, however, that the process of technological upgrading which is observ-
able in export data for emerging regions is by no means a necessary and universally valid 
consequence of globalisation. Rather, the path of export specialisation  is  undetermined: 
Trade integration may either intensify existing comparative advantages and specialisation – 
as in the case of Other South Asia and to a large extent also South America – or induce radi-
cal structural change and as a consequence shift from commodities and low tech industries 
to industries with higher technology contents24
One policy implication of this interpretation of the trade developments over the past 30 years 
is that countries (and regions) are well advised to actively try to seize the opportunities of-
fered by international trade
). The path of export specialisation is undeter-
mined because the comparative advantages themselves, which to a large extent shape the 
patterns of export specialisation, are endogenous and evolve over time.  
25
This nuanced view of international trade is derived from the historical experience of countries 
since the 19th century on the one hand and a dynamic consideration of the effects from 
trade on the other. We start with the second point.  
).  The most successful regions relied strongly on international 
trade and export-led growth strategies. Obviously, an export-led growth strategy is more likely 
to be successful in an open trade environment. However, trade liberalisation alone is not a 
sufficient condition for reaping the gains from trade. In particular, at the beginning of an in-
dustrialisation process, the opening of the economy to world markets and global competition 
typically have to be supported by active and interventionist trade and industrial policies, po-
tentially – as Ha-Joon Chang put it – defying existing comparative advantages.   
Conventional trade theories based on comparative advantages (be they focused on re-
source endowments or technology differences) predict universal and unambiguous gains 
from trade. This result is based on efficiency gains that trading partners can reap by specialis-
ing in and exporting goods they produce at relatively lower costs than their trading partner(s). 
The resulting policy conclusion is that free trade is the optimal trade policy and governments 
should refrain from intervening in this specialisation process by imposing tariffs or handing out 
subsidies to domestic firms. This logic is at the core of the Washington Consensus which rec-
ommends all countries to open up to international trade as much and as quickly as possible 
and to dispense with selective industrial policies that interfere with the resource allocation in 
markets.   
This static view of free trade – which predicts and recommends the re-inforcement of cur-
rently existing comparative advantages – is at odds with the universial strive of countries for 
industrialisation, structural upgrading and for shifting the export basket towards new, more 
complex and ‘sophisticated’ products within industries. As we have tried to show, countries 
do this for good reasons. This contradiction between the policy prescription of the Washing-
                                                       
24) Certainly, globalisation may also induce a technological downgrading if countries lose their existing industries which may not (yet) 
be competitive globally. For the time span under consideration we do not detect such a development in any of the 19 regions. This 
does not rule out the possibility that individual countries suffered from such an unfavourable shift in their production and export. 
25) Here we want to stress the potential merits from trade openness but refrain from discussing the highly controversial issue of opening 
the capital account.   
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ton Consensus and the desire for structural change is founded in the neglect of the dynamic 
effects that may arise from trade and specialisation and an overestimation of the allocative 
efficiency of markets. There is no doubt about the relevance of comparative advantages for 
shaping trade pattern at any point in time. However, instead of treating comparative advan-
tages as a constant feature of an economy, they are endogenous and are subject to con-
siderable change over time. In particular they can be forged by economic policy. Indeed, 
successful countries are not those that simply tried to exploit current comparative advan-
tages but those that actively tried to shift their production structures towards new areas which 
are more complex, more technology intensive and typically higher price-cost mark-ups. Dif-
ferences in the potential to charge mark-ups over production costs across industries (due to 
the potential of learning effects, economies of scale in production,…) imply that it matters in 
which industries a country specialises – in particular it may matter for its long term growth rate. 
Dynamic trade models that incorporate more than one sector and increasing returns in 
manufacturing clearly show that free trade and resulting patterns of specialisation may hurt a 
country’s growth process (e.g. Lucas, 1990) and that the timing of opening up to free trade is 
crucial (Matsuyama, 1992). Acknowledging such differences across  sectors and industries 
and putting the emphasis on growth effects from trade rather than (once-off) efficiency 
gains from trade lead to very different policy recommendations than those prescribed by the 
Washington Consensus (absence of government intervention and full fledged liberalisation).  
From a policy perspective, the idea that specialisation patterns affect economic growth and 
that comparative advantages (at least to some extent) are endogenous and can be 
shaped,  make  active  trade and industrial policies more attractive compared to a purely 
static consideration of the effects of trade26
Turning to the second point that form our nuanced view of free trade – historical experiences 
-  we believe that all developed countries followed a development strategy that is much 
more in line with a dynamic view of trade than with the ideas enshrined in the Washington 
Consensus. If economic history can serve as a guide, the appropriate policy mix for develop-
ing countries should consist of a blend of selective and temporary tariff protection and public 
support to install and develop an international competitive manufacturing sector. Exactly this 
type of policies were pursued by nowadays developed countries – the US in the course of the 
19th century and several Central European nations during the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
– to develop capacities in the leading edge industries of the time (Reinhart, 2007). Basically, 
all emerging and newly industrialised countries in South East Asia used a mix of partial protec-
tionism and export subsidies in industries deemed strategically important (Chang, 2007). The 
recent success of China, the NICs and other East Asian countries with targeted industrial poli-
cies which we highlighted in this paper had to be acknowledged, at least partially, even by 
the World Bank already two decades ago (World Bank, 1993). Basically the only region that 
mastered a spectacular technological upgrading
).  
27
                                                       
26) In a static view of the world in which export patterns emerge as natural consequence of existing comparative advantages and all 
industries are structurally identical free trade emerges as the optimal policy. 
) without notable active and targeted in-
dustrial policies is Eastern Europe. The experience of Eastern Europe is indeed remarkable. It 
can be interpreted as evidence that – unlike the Asian experience – structural upgrading is 
feasible by relying primarily  on  deep  economic integration with more advanced  regional 
partners, in this case the EU. The transformation process that took place in Eastern Europe 
27) The catch-up process started after the ‘transitional recession’ of the early 1990s.   
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strongly relied on the influx of foreign capital and, linked to that, the import of new technolo-
gies. Hence, in the case of Eastern Europe foreign capital did not support the catching-up 
process (as it was the case in most Asian countries) but was the main driver of the process. 
Historically, however, the experience of Eastern Europe that may be characterised as a suc-
cessful catching-up process based on a far-reaching liberalisation of the economy from the 
very beginning and deep regional integration is a rare event. It should also be noted that the 
initial position of Eastern Europe was different from that of many other emerging economies 
as the region had an ‘a history of industrialisation’ and an excellent educational system. So 
the task of structural change was different inasfar as the challenge was to initate an industri-
alisation process from scratch but to turn existing industries into profitable operations and in 
many cases the specialised workforce required for this was available.   
Both trade and industrial policies are powerful tools to induce structural change and techno-
logical upgrading leading to new export specialisations, though some countries or regions 
may choose a different development path. Therefore it seems to be important that all coun-
tries and regions can maintain the required policy space to conduct the type of trade and 
industrial policy that fits best their stage of development.  
For high income regions such as Central Europe (but also for North Europe and West Europe, 
i.e. the UK) active industrial policy is more and more conducted in the form of R&D policies28
Active R&D policies receive strong support from modern trade and growth theories which 
stress the fundamental role of ideas and technologies for growth and development. The dis-
tinguishing factor between ideas and any other product (or production factor) that calls for 
policy intervention is its non-rival nature
). 
As pointed out by Van Pottelsberghe, the EU’s current R&D policies, including direct subsidies 
and tax breaks, is an implicit industrial policy aimed at altering the EU member states’ indus-
trial structures (Van Pottelsberghe, 2008). Moreover, foresight studies typically see it as a 
shortcoming of European science and technology policy that it is less focussed than in the US 
or Japan and suggest a new ‘airbus strategy’ which allows the EU to develop the techno-
logical lead in a key economic field (European Commission, 2006).  
29
Active R&D policies may be very helpful for industrialised countries to keep the technological 
leadership and remain competitive vis-à-vis emerging markets which benefit from lower 
wage costs. According to the same logic, low income regions that have not built up a solid 
). This means that ideas can be used (or consumed) 
by more than one person at the same time and repeatedly. Non-rival goods tend to be un-
derprovisioned in a market economy, which delivers the theoretical rational for public sup-
port of ideas generating processes, i.e. research and development. Hence, consensus has 
emerged that R&D subsidies and other forms of public support for R&D are appropriate indus-
trial policy tools for developed countries. Hence, at least in the analysis of R&D and innova-
tions mainstream economics now stress dynamic effects. Otherwise, subsidies for R&D and 
patent protection which both raise the incentives for firms to invest in R&D (which may turn 
into successful innovations) would not emerge as policy recommendation. In a purely static 
view, patent protection is harmful because it allows the innovating firm to earn monopoly 
profits to the detriment of consumers.   
                                                       
28) This is not to say that developed countries do not employ convential industrial policies – and as the crisis of 2008/2009 has shown to 
a greater extent if need arises. 
29) For a nice overview oft he role of ideas for an economy see Jones and Romer (2010).  
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industrial base  yet – and as was shown by the data there are several such regions – would 
need industrial policies that help them moving their production structures into manufacturing 
industries.  
While the recent track record of low income countries – outside South East and East Asia – 
with respect to industrial policy does not look particularly good, the conclusion cannot be 
that these countries should simply all  renounce on policies aimed at fostering structural 
change. Fortunately, more recently the tide – at least in the academic arena, not necessarily 
the policy arena - has shifted somewhat in favour of selective governments interventions. For 
example, Lin and Monga (2010) recommend that governments in low income industries 
should not act overambitiously and rather target industries that are close to their countries’ 
current comparative advantages which they call latent comparative advantages. These au-
thors also recommend that countries should use pick ‘model countries’ that are significantly 
but not too far ahead in the development process and use them as “economic compass” for 
selecting potential industries to be targeted30
The comparison between R&D policies and conventional industrial policies, we believe, is a 
very valid one and it is a strong argument in favour of temporary protection and subsidies for 
nascent industries – in cases where low income countries think they need such measures to 
master the challenges of global competition in an early phase of industrialisation. After all, in-
fant industry protection and subsidies are not so different from patent protection and R&D 
subsidies which are nowadays more commonly accepted. The ultimate rationales for tempo-
rary protection are incentives and some form of increasing returns to scale. The existence of 
increasing returns in manufacturing industries (producing differentiated goods), now standard 
components in modern trade and growth models, are hardly disputed. Increasing returns to 
scale imply that new industries are not internationally competitive from the start because 
firms have not moved up the learning curve yet and the scale of production is still small. 
Hence, temporary protection and subsidies may increase incentive for private investments by 
first-mover firms in industrial activities that may ultimately become profitable and induce mar-
ket entry by a larger number of firms. First-mover firms bear the risk of failure and in case of 
success will see its profits decline by subsequent entry of follower firms. Therefore entries into 
new industries are deterred (Aghion, 2009). Very much like R&D subsidies and patent protec-
tion raises incentives for firms to invest in R&D (which may turn into successful innovations), in-
vestment subsidies and temporary protection raise incentives for first-mover firms to invest in 
new industries.  
). These may be relevant for countries that lack 
the advantage of having a regional technology leader in the region (as South East Asia and 
Eastern Europe had) and therefore cannot rely on the upgrading-mechanism described in 
the flying-geese-model or the deep regionalism path chosen by Eastern Europe. 
Unfortunately, current WTO rules do not provide a waiver for industrial subsidies in low income 
countries as in the case of R&D subsidies. Moreover, international patent law regulations tend 
to be strengthened while infant industry tariffs for low income countries are not much of an 
issue anymore. 
The challenge of successful industrialisation, including the emergence of competitive export 
industries, is in some sense easier nowadays than it was in the past but at the same time it is 
                                                       
30) As a rough guide the authors recommend that the GDP per capita of the compass country should not exceed that of the country 
in question by more than 100%.   
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also more difficult. It is easier because trade and foreign direct investment eases the transfer 
of knowledge and technologies and may also add to the industrial capacity of host coun-
tries. It is more difficult because the current global trade regime – manifested in the WTO rules 
– considerably reduces the policy space of developing countries to implement the kind of 
policies that in the past proofed successful in fostering industrialisation and technological up-
grading. We refer here both to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘WTO-subsidies code’)31
Hence, we restate that the international trade rules should be designed in a way that gives all 
countries the policy space they require to implement adequate industrial policies. This could 
assist low-income countries in their industrialisation and catch-up process potentially leading 
to an international trading system in which more countries benefit from trade. After all, thanks 
to technological progress and a generally open trade environment the opportunities for 
catching-up and the chances to create a more inclusive global trading system have never 
been as great as they are now – it may however require some rebalancing of current WTO 
rules. 
).  
                                                       
31) For example, while the WTO subsidies code explicitely allows for R&D subsidies for firms of up to 75% of the cost of industrial research 
(Article 8), subsidies for first-mover firms in latent comparative advantage industries would come into conflict with the specificity crite-
rion and be prohibited (‘actionnable’).    
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Definition of World Regions 
Code  Region Name  Bloc    Code  Region Name  Bloc 
AFN  North Africa       ACX  Central America    
DZ  Algeria  AFN    AMO2)  Other America  ACX 
EG  Egypt  AFN    CR  Costa Rica  ACX 
LY  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  AFN    CU  Cuba  ACX 
MA  Morocco  AFN    DO  Dominican Republic  ACX 
SD  Sudan  AFN    GT  Guatemala  ACX 
TN  Tunisia  AFN    HN  Honduras  ACX 
        HAT  Haiti  ACX 
AFS  Other Africa       JM  Jamaica  ACX 
AFO1)  Other Africa  AFS    MX  Mexico  ACX 
AFS  Africa small LDCs  AFS    NI  Nicaragua  ACX 
AO  Angola  AFS    PA  Panama  ACX 
BF  Burkina Faso  AFS    SV  El Salvador  ACX 
BI  Burundi  AFS         
BJ  Benin  AFS    AM  South America    
CD  Democratic Republic of the Congo  AFS    AR  Argentina  AM 
CF  Central African Republic  AFS    BO  Bolivia  AM 
CG  Congo  AFS    BR  Brazil  AM 
CI  Cote d'Ivoire  AFS    CL  Chile  AM 
CM  Cameroon  AFS    CO  Colombia  AM 
ET  Ethiopia  AFS    EC  Ecuador  AM 
GH  Ghana  AFS    PE  Peru  AM 
GN  Guinea  AFS    PY  Paraguay  AM 
KE  Kenya  AFS    UY  Uruguay  AM 
LR  Liberia  AFS    VE  Venezuela  AM 
MG  Madagascar  AFS         
ML  Mali  AFS    IN  India    
MR  Mauritania  AFS    IN  India  IN 
MW  Malawi  AFS         
MZ  Mozambique  AFS    ASO  Other South Asia    
NE  Niger  AFS    AF  Afghanistan  ASO 
NG  Nigeria  AFS    ASL3)  Other South Asia  ASO 
RW  Rwanda  AFS    BD  Bangladesh  ASO 
SL  Sierra Leone  AFS    LK  Sri Lanka  ASO 
SN  Senegal  AFS    NP  Nepal  ASO 
SO  Somalia  AFS    PK  Pakistan  ASO 
TD  Chad  AFS         
TG  Togo  AFS    CI  Commonwealth of Independent 
 
  
TZ  United Republic of Tanzania  AFS    SU  Former Soviet Union  CI 
UG  Uganda  AFS         
ZA  South Africa  AFS         
ZM  Zambia  AFS         
ZW  Zimbabwe  AFS         
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Appendix 1 – Definition of World Regions (continued) 
             
Code  Region Name  Bloc    Code  Region Name  Bloc 
JA  Japan       EUC  Central  Europe    
JP  Japan  JA    AT  Austria  EUC 
        BEL  Belgium-Luxembourg  EUC 
CN  China       CH  Switzerland  EUC 
CNM  China inc Macao  CN    DE  Germany  EUC 
        FR  France  EUC 
EAH  East Asia High Income       NL  Netherlands  EUC 
HK  Hong Kong SAR of China  EAH         
KR  Republic of Korea  EAH    EUE  East Europe    
SG  Singapore  EAH    AL  Albania  EUE 
TW  Taiwan  EAH    BG  Bulgaria  EUE 
        CS  Former Czechoslovakia  EUE 
EAO  Other East Asia       HU  Hungary  EUE 
ID  Indonesia  EAO    PL  Poland  EUE 
KH  Cambodia  EAO    RO  Romania  EUE 
KP  Democratic Peoples Rep of Korea  EAO    YU  Former Yugoslavia  EUE 
LA  Lao Peoples Democratic Republic  EAO         
MM  Myanmar  EAO    EUN  North Europe    
MN  Mongolia  EAO    DK  Denmark  EUN 
MY  Malaysia  EAO    FI  Finland  EUN 
OCO4)  Other Oceania  EAO    NO  Norway  EUN 
PG  Papua New Guinea  EAO    SE  Sweden  EUN 
PH  Philippines  EAO         
TH  Thailand  EAO    EUS  South Europe    
VN  Vietnam  EAO    ES  Spain  EUS 
        OEU 6)  Other Europe  EUS 
WA  West Asia       GR  Greece  EUS 
AE  United Arab Emirates  WA    IE  Ireland  EUS 
BH  Bahrain  WA    IT  Italy  EUS 
IQ  Iraq  WA    PT  Portugal  EUS 
IR  Iran (Islamic Republic of)  WA         
JO  Jordan  WA    EUW  West Europe    
KW  Kuwait  WA    GB  United Kingdom  EUW 
LB  Lebanon  WA         
MEO5)  Other Middle East  WA    OD  Other Developed    
OM  Oman  WA    AU  Australia  OD 
SA  Saudi Arabia  WA    CA  Canada  OD 
SY  Syrian Arab Republic  WA    IL  Israel  OD 
TR  Turkey  WA    NZ  New Zealand  OD 
YE  Republic of Yemen  WA         
        US  USA    
        US  United States  US 
1) AFO includes: Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles. 
2) AMO includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bermuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Grenada, Guyana, Anguilla, Saint 
                                     
      
3) ASL includes: Bhutan, Maldives. 
4) OCO includes: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Caledonia, Nauru, French Polynesia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, British Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, Sa-
  5) MEO includes: Qatar, Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
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Source: Hatzichronoglou (1997) 